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INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2002, twins Jeana and Jenna Hoffman led their
South Dakota high school basketball team to a perfect regular
season.1 That same school year, in the winter, the twins helped their
gymnastics team finish third in the state meet.2 Now, however, rather
than continuing to shine in two sports and continuing to cultivate two
possibilities for college athletic scholarships, the Hoffman twins must
give up one of the sports to which they have devoted years of hard
work.3 As the result of a recent wave of constitutional challenges,4 the
state of South Dakota has been forced to rearrange its high school
athletic scheduling.5 Parents have filed suit against high school
athletic associations arguing that their children are cheated out of
athletic opportunities—including the ultimate prize of a college
scholarship—because of the scheduling of certain interscholastic
sports seasons.6
Many of the litigants are parents of volleyball players who want
the volleyball season moved from the winter season to the fall season,
in hopes of increasing their daughters’ exposure to college coaches.
Copyright © 2003 by Courtney E. Schafer.
1. Chris Solari, Switching Seasons Will Hurt Gymnasts, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls,
S.D.), Feb. 17, 2002, at C6, available at 2002 WL 20592580.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Chris Solari, Change in Tradition, Girls Season Switch, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls,
S.D.), Aug. 11, 2002 at A1, available at 2002 WL 20595437 (discussing challenges to girls’
athletic seasons in Arizona, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and West
Virginia).
5. Id.
6. See Solari, supra note 1 (“[P]arents prompted the move. Actually, the fear of lawsuits
from those parents, claiming their daughters can’t be properly recruited by
colleges unless the seasons are swapped.”).
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What such litigation ignores, however, is that even if volleyball
players would benefit from such a switch, an equal number of other
athletes would suffer. The rearrangement in South Dakota, for
instance, shifts girls’ basketball to the winter, causing the state’s
female basketball players to receive less exposure to college
recruiters. Worse yet, many girls like the Hoffman twins are forced to
choose between two sports that did not conflict in the previous
system. Thus, regardless of whether the sports seasons are rearranged
or the current schedule remains in place, it is unavoidable that some
girls will feel as though they are denied the opportunities and
exposure that other girls receive.
This Note focuses on the constitutional implications of
scheduling high school athletic seasons for girls’ and boys’ sports
teams during different times of the academic year. This issue has
recently impacted school districts in many states, affecting high school
athletes of both genders. The magnitude of the impact is illustrated by
the reluctance of athletic associations to switch high school athletic
seasons in nearly every state in which the season scheduling has been
challenged.7 For example, of the five states that scheduled girls’
basketball as a fall sport, and girls’ volleyball as a winter sport during
the 2002-03 school year, four have announced that they will reverse
the seasons to match the rest of the country by the 2003-04 season.8
Of the four states making changes, only one was not prompted by
a lawsuit.9
7. Jane Bos, Michigan Will Soon Stand Alone—Four States Moving Girls Hoops to Winter,
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 6, 2001, at D10, available at 2001 WL 25385084. In Montana, the
high school association was ordered to make the switch by the Human Rights Bureau in
Montana’s Department of Labor and Industry. Id. A suit was filed in federal court to compel
South Dakota to “flop the seasons,” and the sides settled out of court. Id. South Dakota’s High
School Activities Association was opposed to the switch, but was unable to fight the decision
based on financial burdens. Id. It did not feel as though it could afford the legal battle that
would have ensued. Id. The suit in Virginia was based on the state’s split basketball and
volleyball seasons. Two classes of high schools played basketball in the fall and volleyball in the
winter, while basketball was a winter season and volleyball a fall season for the largest class of
high schools. Id. This setup created problems for female student athletes whose school
classification periodically switched based on enrollment, and forced them to choose between the
two sports. Id.
8. See id. (noting that Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Virginia will reverse
seasons to align with the majority of states).
9. See id. (quoting a North Dakota official who stated that “[s]ome parts of our state are
sparsely populated, and to lose competition from schools in different states because of different
seasons would be very difficult for travel expenses”).
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In Michigan, however, a landmark legal battle has been initiated
which will define the legal parameters for this issue in the future. The
case, Communities for Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic
Ass’n,10 was recently appealed to the Sixth Circuit and is currently
pending review.11 This Note examines and critiques the district court’s
opinion in Communities for Equity. It demonstrates that
nontraditional high school athletic seasons are not only legally
permissible, but in many ways are more advantageous than traditional
high school athletic seasons. As such, so long as the differences
between boys’ and girl’s programs are negligible and justified,
separate interscholastic athletic seasons do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause or Title IX.
Part I of this Note outlines the legal standards that govern the
issue, focusing on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title IX of the Education Amendments as applied
to high school athletics. Part II examines the background and
rationale of the district court’s decision in Communities for Equity.
Part III then critiques the district court’s rationale in light of prior
case history, the established standards under Title IX and the Equal
Protection Clause, and the district court’s own internal inconsistency.
This Part demonstrates that nontraditional sports seasons do not
violate either Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause. In addition,
Part III illustrates the advantages that nontraditional sports seasons
provide many girls. Finally, Part IV evaluates the widespread
practical and potential effects of the Communities for Equity decision,
and presents strategies for future defenses against a claim of gender
inequity based on constitutional challenges to the scheduling of high
school athletics seasons.
I.  THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND TITLE IX AS APPLIED TO
INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC PROGRAMS
Discrimination against student-athletes has long been an issue of
contention in the courts. Laws that discriminate against student-
athletes based on their gender implicate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 In addition to this constitutional
provision, a specific, federal protection against gender discrimination
10. 178 F. Supp. 2d 805 (W.D. Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed
May 9, 2002).
11. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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in educational institutions was created when Congress passed Title IX
of the Educational Amendments of 1972.13 Plaintiffs often allege
violations of both the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX in suits
involving gender discrimination in athletics.14 While some courts will
consider both an equal protection claim and a Title IX claim, other
courts have held that Title IX provides the exclusive remedy in such
cases.15 This Part discusses the implications of the Equal Protection
Clause and Title IX in the context of high school athletic scheduling.
A. Gender-Based Discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause provides: “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”16 Only state actors may
be liable for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,17 and the
Supreme Court has made clear that high school athletic associations
are state actors subject to the strictures of the Equal Protection
Clause.18
When evaluating an equal protection challenge to gender-based
discrimination, courts subject the classification to so-called
“intermediate scrutiny.”19 Pursuant to intermediate scrutiny, the
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
14. See, e.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 609–10 (6th Cir.
2002); Ridgeway v. Mont. High Sch. Ass’n, 858 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1988); Cynthia Lutz
Kelly, Participation in Athletic Programs: Clearing the Title IX and Equal Protection Hurdles, in
LEGAL HANDBOOK ON SCHOOL ATHLETICS 5-1, 5-10 (Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n ed., 1997) (“Some
courts have considered [Equal Protection] claims along with the Title IX claims; other courts
have concluded that Title IX provides the exclusive remedy . . . .”).
15. See Williams v. Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he constitutional
claims are ‘subsumed’ in title IX, and . . . the district court, having addressed the title IX claim,
properly refused to hear plaintiff’s section 1983 claim.”); Kelly, supra note 14, at 5–10. But see
Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 648 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the conclusion in Williams as
inconsistent with the regulation).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. Rivera v. PS Group of P.R., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.P.R. 2002) (“A plaintiff
claiming an equal protection violation must show that state actors intentionally discriminated
against her.”); Boateng v. Inter American Univ., 190 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.P.R. 1999) (“In general
terms, Constitutional rights of individuals are only actionable against a state actor.”).
18. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001)
(“[T]he association’s regulatory activity may and should be treated as state action owing to the
pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association.”).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (“[A]ll gender-based
classifications today warrant heightened scrutiny.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hines v.
Caston Sch. Corp., 651 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“A gender-based discriminatory
classification is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.”); Kelly, supra note 14, at 5-10.
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discriminatory classification must serve “important governmental
objectives” using means that are “substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.”20 Courts focus on the “differential
treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought.”21 Courts
refuse to accept justifications that are based on archaic or overbroad
generalizations about male and female interests and abilities.22 No
showing of animus, or intentional discrimination, is required when the
defendant’s rule treats males and females differently on its face.23
B. Title IX
Though the majority of early Title IX litigation concerned
intercollegiate athletics,24 Title IX made clear that the athletic
department of any school district that receives any amount of federal
funding for any purpose must comply with the requirements of Title
IX.25 Thus, regulation of interscholastic high school athletics is
enforceable under the statute. In recent years, discrimination suits
against interscholastic associations and organizations, as well as
individual schools, have become more common.26 Because lawsuits
brought to compel the change of nontraditional sports seasons
typically allege violations of Title IX, it is important to outline the
legal background in this area before analyzing the legality of
nontraditional high school athletic seasons.
20. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler v.
Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
21. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33; see also Gonzalez v. Kahan, No. CV 88-922
(RJD), 1996 WL 705320, at *2 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 1996) (“[A] plaintiff alleging sex
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause must show that the defendant
discriminated against her because of her membership in an identifiable group, as opposed to
characteristics of her gender personal to her.”).
22. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
23. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 848–49 (W.D.
Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed May 9, 2002).
24. See Ray Yasser & Samuel J. Schiller, Gender Equity in Athletics: The New Battleground
of Interscholastic Sports, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 371 (1997) (“Until now, Title IX
has had its most profound impact on intercollegiate athletics.”).
25. Id. at 373–74; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
26. See, e.g., Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 1994)
(alleging gender discrimination based on school’s sanctioning fewer sports for girls than for
boys, and refusing to sanction girls’ interscholastic fast-pitch softball); Ridgeway v. Mont. High
Sch. Ass’n, 858 F.2d 579, 581 (9th Cir. 1988) (seeking relief for gender discrimination based on
nontraditional seasons for girls’ volleyball and basketball); Striebel v. Minn. State High Sch.
League, 321 N.W.2d 400, 401 (Minn. 1982) (challenging, on equal protection grounds, a
Minnesota statute authorizing separate seasons for high school athletic teams separated
according to gender).
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1. History and Purpose. Title IX was enacted as part of the
Education Amendments of 1972 with the goal of eliminating sex
discrimination in education.27 Section 901(a) of the statute states that
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”28 Although Title IX applies to
education services generally, it also has specific provisions related to
scholastic athletic opportunities. Specifically, section 106.41(c)29 sets
forth an equal opportunity requirement for scholastic athletic
programs, providing that any recipient of federal funds that operates
or sponsors “interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both
sexes.”30 In 1988, Congress made clear that compliance with Title IX
was mandatory for any educational institution that received federal
funding, regardless of whether that funding was used for the program
in question.31
2. Factors which Guide the Title IX Analysis. The ten factors
that should be considered in a Title IX analysis are provided in 34
C.F.R. § 106.41(c). These factors include:
(1) whether the selection of sports and levels of
competition effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) scheduling of games and practice times;
(4) travel and per diem allowance;
27. Ridgeway, 858 F.2d at 581 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating the background of Title IX in
Congress); H.R. REP. No. 92-554, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2467 (“This
title prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs or activities receiving
financial support from the Federal government.”).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
29. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2002).
30. Id.
31. S. REP. NO. 100-64, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 6 (“The Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987 amends each of the affected statutes by adding a section defining the
phrase ‘program or activity’ and ‘program’ to make clear that discrimination is prohibited
throughout entire agencies or institutions if any part receives Federal financial assistance.”);
Kelly, supra note 14, at 5-1 (stating that the passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987
was evidence of Congress’s intent).
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(5) opportunity to receive coaching and academic
tutoring;
(6) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;
(8) provision of medical and training facilities and
services;
(9) provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
and
(10) publicity.32
In Cohen v. Brown University,33 one of the first landmark Title IX
cases, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
treated the regulations as “a non-exclusive compendium of ten factors
which [the Office of Civil Rights] will consider in assessing
compliance with this mandate.”34 The first of these factors, effective
accommodation, is the most important factor, and “an institution may
violate Title IX solely by failing to effectively accommodate the
interests and abilities of student athletes of both sexes.”35
The Title IX regulations’ Policy Interpretation, which was
adopted by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR),36 serves as a second
guide for analyzing Title IX claims. The Policy Interpretation includes
three major areas of compliance—athletic financial assistance,
equivalence in other athletic benefits and opportunities, and effective
accommodation of student interests and abilities.37 The OCR Policy
Interpretation provides a three-prong test for the first requirement of
32. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
33. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
34. Id. at 396.
35. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Roberts v. Colo. State Bd.
of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897–98).
36. The Policy Interpretation initially was adopted by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) in December 1979. Title IX of the Education Amendment of
1972: A Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter OCR Policy
Interpretation]; see also 45 C.F.R. pt. 86 (2002) (codifying provisions from this section of the
Federal Register).
37. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37(c), 106.41(c)(1), 106.41(c)(2)–(10) (2002); see also Jennifer L.
Henderson, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: A Commitment to Fairness, 5 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 133, 141–42 (1995) (“The Policy Interpretations include three major areas of
compliance: Athletic Financial Assistance (Scholarships); Equivalence in Other Athletic
Benefits and Opportunities; and Effective Accommodation of Student Interests and Abilities.”).
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section 106.41(c), effective accommodation.38 These three tests for
participation examine (1) whether the “participation opportunities
for male and female students are provided in numbers substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments,” (2) whether the
institution can show both a history and continuing practice of
expansion of programs responsive of the developing interests and
abilities of the members of a traditionally underrepresented sex, or
(3) whether the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex
have been “fully and effectively accommodated” by the present
program.39 The court in Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania,40
the first explicitly to adopt the OCR’s Policy Interpretation, assigned
the burden of proof for the first factor to the plaintiff, and for the
second and third factors to the defendant.41 An institution must satisfy
at least one of the prongs of the test in order to be found in
compliance with the effective accommodation requirement of the
regulations.42 Though this three-prong test has been utilized primarily
in the context of colleges and universities,43 section 106.41(a) of the
regulations also makes this test applicable to high school, or
interscholastic athletics.44
Thus, when determining whether an educational institution has
provided an equal opportunity to students of both sexes, the court’s
38. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,418; see also Jill Mulderink, Par for the
Female Course: Cohen v. Brown University Mandates an Equal Playing Field in Intercollegiate
Athletics, 22 J.C. & U.L. 111, 119 (1995) (“In order for a university to comply with the Effective
Accommodation requirement of the regulations, it must meet at least one prong of [a] three
prong test . . . .”).
39. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,418.
40. 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
41. Id. at 584; see also Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in
Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992–93: Defining the “Equal Opportunity” Standard, 1994 DET.
C.L. REV. 953, 972–73 (1994) (“[T]he court utilized the three-prong analysis found in the OCR
Policy Interpretation . . . . [It] assigned the defendant the burden of proof as to the second and
third factors.”).
42. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,418; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584; see also
Mulderink, supra note 38 at 119–20.
43. Williams v. Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 171 (3d. Cir. 1993) (“Although designed
specifically for intercollegiate athletics, the Policy Interpretation specifically states that ‘its
general principles will often apply to . . . interscholastic athletic programs which are also covered
by regulation’ . . . .”).
44. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2002) (“No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or
otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics offered by a recipient . . . .”).
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analysis should consider the factors in section 106.41(c), as well as the
three-prong test in the OCR Policy Interpretation.
II.  MICHIGAN ATTEMPTS TO HOLD OUT—COMMUNITIES FOR
EQUITY V. MICHIGAN HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
Numerous issues relating to scholastic athletic programs have
been litigated under Title IX since its enactment. The litigation over
the scheduling of girls’ sports in nontraditional seasons is one of the
most recent issues to be brought before the courts. This Part will
review one of the latest, and most vigorously contested, of these
cases.
A. Background—Traditional and Disadvantageous Seasons
Of the states in which litigation has been threatened, Michigan
has fought the court-ordered athletic season switch the most
vigorously. The Communities for Equity case, initiated in June of
1998, reached the District Court of Western Michigan three and a half
years later.45 A suit alleging discrimination against Michigan female
high school athletes was brought under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.46 The plaintiffs, mothers of student-athletes,
claimed that the Michigan High School Athletic Association
(MHSAA) “schedules athletic seasons and tournaments for six girls’
sports during less advantageous times of the academic year than boys’
athletic seasons and tournaments, and that this scheduling of girls’
athletic seasons constitutes legally inequitable treatment.”47
The plaintiffs allege that the sports at issue, excepting girls’ golf,
are played in nontraditional seasons, that these seasons are
disadvantageous seasons for the sports, and thus the system creates
inequities for female student-athletes.48 Though girls’ golf is played in
45. See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 807
(W.D. Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed May 9, 2002) (stating the legal
background of the case).
46. See Id. (noting that state claims were also brought under the Elliot-Larson Civil Rights
Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2101–.2804 (West 2001)).
47. Id. These girls’ sports and their current seasons include: volleyball in the winter;
basketball, tennis, Lower Peninsula swimming and diving in the fall; and soccer and Lower
Peninsula golf in the spring. Id.
48. Id.
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the “traditional”49 season of spring, plaintiffs claim that fall is a
superior season for golf in Michigan.50
Whether a sports season is “traditional” is only important if the
traditional season is also “the most advantageous playing season for
the high school sports at issue.”51 The court stated that it is legally
possible for a girls’ sport to be held in a nontraditional season and a
boys’ sport during the traditional season, so long as girls and boys are
equally advantaged by the sports season.52
B. Rejection of the Justifications for the Current Seasons Offered by
the MHSSA
At trial, the MHSAA put forth various justifications for
scheduling these sports in nontraditional seasons, but the district
court ultimately rejected all of them. The first justification raised by
the MHSAA was that serious logistical concerns exist concerning
facilities, officials, and coaches. The MHSAA argued that there are
not enough gymnasiums, soccer fields, and pools in Michigan to
schedule basketball, soccer, and swimming seasons concurrently.53
Rearranging the seasons would cause a reduction in opportunities for
both sexes, as schools would have to cut team sizes or eliminate
freshman or junior varsity teams.54 Sponsoring the greatest number of
teams possible and maximizing participation opportunities are legally
legitimate goals.55 However, the court found that the MHSAA failed
to meet its burden of production and persuasion on this point,
because its evidence was “almost exclusively anecdotal” and there
was insufficient evidence demonstrating that schools have inadequate
facilities.56 The court also rejected the argument that in other states
where athletic seasons are scheduled concurrently for both genders,
there are lower participation numbers than in Michigan, calling the
MHSAA’s evidence “circumstantial.”57
49. The court construed “traditional” to mean the season when the sport is usually played
at most levels. Id. at 808.
50. Id. at 807. The boys’ golf season in Michigan is in the fall. Id.
51. Id. at 808.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 840.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 839.
56. Id. at 840.
57. Id. at 841.
SCHAFER.DOC 01/30/04 9:05 AM
2003] FOLLOWING THE LAW, NOT THE CROWD 233
The MHSAA contended that there are insufficient coaches in
Michigan to schedule soccer and swimming concurrently. The court
found that the empirical evidence on this point was “too sparse to
make a finding that this [was] true.”58 The court also found that the
MHSAA failed to support its assertion that some schools would have
problems finding “qualified” game officials.59
Second, the MHSAA offered survey evidence showing that
Michigan girls and member schools prefer to play in the current
seasons.60 The court found that the survey suffered from “design flaws
and bias,” because (1) no benefits of changing seasons were involved
in the survey, (2) only sixty of MHSAA’s 729 member schools
participated, (3) only one-third of the girls in those schools were
surveyed, and (4) the original, written survey responses were
destroyed before the plaintiffs or their experts could view them.61 The
court held that “a comprehensive study of the possibilities of
changing seasons, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of
various seasons, should have been the task of the MHSAA.”62 In
addition, the court noted that several student-athletes testified for the
plaintiff, while the MHSAA failed to offer the testimony of any
student-athletes or parents who favored the current seasons of play.63
Finally, the MHSAA claimed that its nontraditional seasons give
girls an “independent identity.”64 The MHSSA argued that girls
benefit from their own independent athletic seasons. For example,
girls’ basketball does not have to compete with boys’ basketball for
attention, which results in increased media coverage and recruiting
opportunities for the girls.65 The MHSAA offered testimony that the
separate seasons showed that girls would be successful and attract
fans to the games on their own merits.66 However, the court found
that the separate seasons “sends a message that the girls’ basketball
58. Id. at 842.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 842–43. Western Michigan University’s Evaluation Center was commissioned by
the MHSAA to conduct the survey after the lawsuit was filed. Id.
61. Id. at 843.
62. Id. at 844.
63. Id. at 843.
64. Id. at 845.
65. Id.
66. Id. (discussing the testimony of K. McGee, girls’ basketball coach at Flint Powers
High School).
SCHAFER.DOC 01/30/04 9:05 AM
234 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:223
programs cannot be ‘fitted in’ to the ‘regular’ basketball season
of winter.”67
C. Legal Claims
1. The Equal Protection Claim. After a review of MHSAA’s
arguments, the court ruled that the MHSAA’s athletic scheduling
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, the court found that the MHSAA is a state actor, and thus
subject to liability for constitutional violations.68 As high school
athletes are segregated according to gender, the defendants bore the
burden of showing an “exceedingly persuasive” justification, where
the classification “serves important governmental objectives and the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.”69 The court found that the MHSAA
failed to meet its burden because “none of the girls sports at issue are
scheduled in the advantageous season.”70 Although the justifications
that were offered by the MHSAA were “important,”71 the
discriminatory scheduling was not “substantially related” to achieving
the stated objectives.72 The court held that the MHSAA relied on
“anecdotal and weak circumstantial evidence,” which was insufficient
to support its justifications, and therefore “violated and continues to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment by its current scheduling of
seasons for the sports at issue.”73
2. The Title IX Claim. The court held that MHSAA also was
subject to liability under Title IX.74 The MHSAA has the required
67. Id.
68. Id. at 846–48. The district court relied on the decision in Brentwood Academy v. Tenn.
Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), in which the Supreme Court found that
Tennessee’s high school athletic association was a state actor based on the Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association (TSSAA)’s makeup and role in the administration of high school
athletics in the state. Id. at 846 (citing Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 298–300). The district
court agreed that the MHSAA was virtually identical to the TSSAA, and thus was a state actor.
Id. at 847.
69. Id. at 848.
70. Id. at 850.
71. Legitimate objectives included maximizing athletic participation for both sexes with
more teams and openings on those teams, and maintaining the quality of the current programs
with better coaches and officials able to work during both seasons. Id. at 850.
72. Id. at 850–51.
73. Id. at 851.
74. Id. The court discussed the requirements for an organization to be subject to Title IX,
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“controlling authority” to schedule interscholastic sports in Michigan,
and thus has “implicitly contracted with the federal government and
had notice to obey the conditions under which member schools
receive federal funding.”75 Further, the court found that the plaintiffs
established a Title IX violation by demonstrating that the MHSAA’s
sports season schedule denied Michigan high school female athletes
the benefits that they would “otherwise enjoy” if they were male.76
The court reasoned that scheduling sports in disadvantageous seasons
for one sex violates Title IX when “the resulting harms are substantial
enough to deny equal participation opportunities and benefits” for
that gender.77 The court also rejected the MHSAA’s argument that
Title IX claims require proof of animus on the part of the MHSAA.78
According to the court, the unequal opportunities for girls79 indicated
a Title IX violation.80 In any Title IX case, “[d]ifferent treatment can
still result in equal opportunities for boys and girls, but it also may
not, which is the reason for analyzing and comparing the benefits and
burdens of the differential treatment.”81
D. Holding and Appeal
The court retained jurisdiction over the case until an appropriate
remedy was enacted, and ordered the MHSAA to change its
scheduling of high school athletic seasons to comply with the law by
the 2003-04 academic year.82 The court required that any remaining
single-sex seasons in the proposed schedule must disadvantage and
advantage boys and girls as a group equally.83 Thus, the MHSAA was
including receiving federal funding, or having “controlling authority” over entities that receive
federal funding. Id. at 851–56. The MHSAA receives revenues from controlling and regulating
the member schools who directly receive federal funding. Id. at 851.
75. Id. at 855; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
76. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 855 (W.D.
Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed May 9, 2002).
77. Id. at 856 (referring to OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,416–71,418).
78. Id.
79. This part of the court’s conclusion was based on the evidence described in the findings
of fact, which showed that all of the girls’ sports at issue “are subject to disadvantages,” as a
result of being denied the right to play their sports in the same season that the boys do, and in
the case of girls-only volleyball, being denied the right to play during volleyball’s “traditional”
season, as all boys-only teams do. Id. at 857, 817–39.
80. Id. at 857.
81. Id. at 856.
82. Id. at 862.
83. Id.
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not mandated to combine girls’ and boys’ seasons for any specific
sport.84 The MHSAA was required to submit a compliance plan that
set forth the new schedule for athletic seasons by June 24, 2002.85
1. Submission and Review of the Compliance Plan. The initial
compliance plan, submitted as required by the MHSAA on May 22,
2002, was soundly rejected by Judge Enslen on August 1, 2002.86 This
compliance plan was developed by the MHSAA after more than fifty
meetings with member schools, as well as a statewide survey.87 The
submitted plan was the one most favored by the member schools,88
which rejected swapping the volleyball and basketball seasons by a
wide margin.89 The plan submitted by the MHSAA was literally in
84. The court also suggested that putting lower level freshman or junior varsity teams of
both sexes into the disadvantageous season would create compliance. Id.
85. Id. at 861. The detailed compliance plan had to be submitted to the court by the
summer of 2002, and the plaintiffs would get a time period in which to respond to the proposed
plan. At this point, the court would decide whether the plan would bring Michigan into
compliance with the law. Id.
86. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:98-CV-479, 2002 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 14220, at *19 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2002); see also Press Release, MHSAA, Federal
Judge Realigns Sports in Seasons Case; Executive Director John E. “Jack” Roberts Issues
Statement (Aug. 1, 2002), at http://www.mhsaa.com/news/02ruling.html (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (explaining the ruling).
87. Jane Bos, Change Seasons for Girls Sports, Court Says, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct. 30,
2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 101245715.
88. Id. Approximately 86 percent of MHSAA member high schools (649 schools)
responded to the sports season survey. See Press Release, MHSAA, Sports Seasons Survey
Results (May 22, 2002), at http://www.mhsaa.com/news/02survey.pdf (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (tracking the Sports Season Lawsuit). Of the 649 member schools responding, 42.1
percent supported the plan the MHSAA submitted on May 24. Id. In addition, out of 649
schools, 509 selected basketball as the one girls’ sport that the school least wanted moved to a
different season. Id. 527 of the schools also selected basketball as the one boys’ sport that the
school least wanted moved. Id. For the one sport that the school least wants to see boys’ and
girls’ seasons combined, 492 schools, or 75.8 percent of respondents, selected basketball. Id.
89. Bob Becker, Ruling Thursday Could Change Girls Sports Landscape; District Judge to
Decide on MHSAA Scheduling Plan, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 31, 2002, available at 2002
WL 23818573. The MHSAA’s compliance plan also noted the difficulties involved in devising a
season switch.
[T]he diversity of the association’s membership is so great that a change in sports
seasons that might be best in one situation could be worst in another. For example:
(1) While larger schools in some locations might be able to compensate for reversed
or combined sports seasons because they have sufficient numbers of students,
facilities and other resources, smaller schools in most locations fear that certain
changes will eliminate one or more sports or levels of teams in those sports, or
significantly reduce the quality of those programs; and (2) Solutions that could be
considered for Lower Peninsula schools were inapplicable to Upper Peninsula schools
because some of those schools schedule sports in different seasons than do schools in
the Lower Peninsula.
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compliance with Judge Enslen’s order, which had stated that the
compliance plan would be approved as long as girls and boys equally
shared advantages and disadvantages.90 The plan called for the
seasons for girls’ and boys’ tennis, swimming, and golf seasons to be
switched, resulting in a balance of three “disadvantaged” sports for
both boys and girls.91 The plan also promised to begin postseason
tournaments for four new girls’ sports before adding any new
tournaments for boys’ sports.92 Not only did the new proposal meet
Judge Enslen’s requirements, but it also addressed the plaintiff’s
original request that the court require the MHSAA to “schedule the
same number of male and female sports in non-traditional seasons,
‘so as to allocate the benefits and burdens of playing in different
seasons equally between females and males.’”93
Judge Enslen rejected the MHSAA’s initial Compliance Plan,
despite the fact that the plan appeared to meet the district court’s
requirements.94 This rejection flew in the face of Judge Enslen’s
previous district court order, in which he held that
[t]he parties are reminded that Defendant MHSAA may design the
new schedule in a number of different ways, and as long as girls and
boys share the advantages and disadvantages of the new seasons
equitably, this Court will approve the Compliance Plan. For
example, Defendant MHSAA is not required to combine seasons of
girls teams and boys teams in any particular sport, but any remaining
single-sex seasons must as a group advantage and disadvantage girls
and boys equally.95
Compliance Plan of the MHSAA for the U.S. District Court (submitted May 22, 2002)
[hereinafter Compliance Plan], at http://www.mhsaa.com/news/02plan.pdf (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
90. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 862.
91. Becker, supra note 89; Amended Compliance Plan (submitted October 30, 2002) at
http://www.mhsaa.com/news/amendplan.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
92. Bos, supra note 87. This would be done by adding two new tournaments each year for
consecutive years, with the association choosing the sports from a list of twelve. Press Release,
MHSAA, MHSAA Submits Sports Seasons Plan; Proposal Adds Four Tournaments (May 22,
2002), at http://www.MHSAA.com/news/02complianceplan.html (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
93. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
94. Cmtys. for Equity, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14220, at *19 (“The MHSAA’s proposed
Compliance Plan is therefore rejected as not achieving equity.”).
95. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 862.
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Judge Enslen contradicted himself, ruling in his August 1 opinion that
the MHSAA had to switch the girls’ basketball and volleyball seasons
to be in compliance.96
The MHSAA resignedly submitted an amended compliance plan
to the district court on October 30, 2002.97 In addition to requiring a
swap of the girls’ volleyball and basketball seasons, the district court
had ordered the MHSAA to select one of three configurations
involving other sports.98 The option that the MHSAA selected in the
amended compliance plan altered the scheduling of five other sports:
golf, soccer, swimming, diving, and tennis.99 Unsurprisingly, on
November 8, 2002, the district court accepted the amended
compliance plan, which was consistent with its August 1, 2002 opinion
and order.100 On February 27, 2003, the district court reaffirmed its
November 8, 2002 decision, and accepted the MHSAA’s amended
compliance plan to reschedule its postseason tournaments.101
2. The MHSAA’s Appeal to the Sixth Circuit. The February 27,
2003 affirmation of the amended compliance plan freed the MHSAA
to commence the appeals process to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Previously, the MHSAA had appealed
the district court’s December 21, 2001 decision to the Sixth Circuit,
which on May 9, 2002, granted the Association a stay in switching the
seasons.102 At that time, the Sixth Circuit ordered the MHSAA to
proceed with the compliance plan as ordered by the district court,
holding that the appeal process could begin when all issues had been
96. Cmtys. for Equity, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14220, at *19–20. The three options that
Judge Enslen gave the defendants all would have resulted in girls’ basketball scheduled in the
winter and girls’ volleyball scheduled in the fall. Id.
97. Amended Compliance Plan, supra note 91.
98. Cmtys. for Equity, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14220, at *19–20.
99. Id. In Michigan’s Lower Peninsula, the plan included switching golf and tennis
tournaments for girls and boys, so that girls’ golf was offered in the fall, boys’ golf offered in the
winter, boys’ tennis in the fall, and girls’ tennis in the spring. In the Upper Peninsula, the golf
and swimming and diving tournaments will be held in the same season for boys and girls (golf in
spring and swimming and diving in the winter), and soccer tournaments will be scheduled in the
fall for girls and the spring for boys. See Amended Compliance Plan, supra note 91.
100. Press Release, MHSAA, Compliance Plan Accepted by District Court in Sports
Seasons Case (Nov. 11, 2002), at http://www.mhsaa.com/news/03courtplan.html (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
101. Cmtys. For Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:98-CV-479, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2872, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2003).
102. Cmtys. for Equities v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 02-1127, slip op. at 3 (6th
Cir. filed May 9, 2002).
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settled in the lower courts.103 However, The Sixth Circuit granted the
MHSAA’s stay, holding that “the stay motion raises serious . . . issues
concerning liability under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause,”
and that the MHSAA “has articulated a variety of harms that it, its
member schools, and the student athletes may suffer if it must comply
with the injunction by bringing its scheduling into compliance with
the district court’s ruling.”104 The first round of the appeals process is
projected to last approximately a year.105 Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s stay
ensures that any change to Michigan high school athletic seasons is
unlikely to occur before the 2004-05 school year at the earliest.106
III.  CRITIQUE OF THE COMMUNITIES FOR EQUITY DECISION
The district court’s reasoning in Communities for Equity is
flawed in numerous respects. The critique of this decision set forth in
this Part is divided into three broad categories. First, this Part
illustrates that the district court misconstrued the intent of the Policy
Interpretation, that Michigan’s current sports schedule comports with
the Policy Interpretation, and consequently that the MHSAA does
not violate Title IX. Second, this Part argues that the court incorrectly
interpreted references to recruiting in the OCR Policy Interpretation.
Finally, this Part argues that evidence of higher participation rates of
student athletes in Michigan meets the “exceedingly persuasive
justification” standard that is required to dismiss the plaintiff’s equal
protection challenge.
A. The Court Failed to Adequately Consider the OCR Policy
Interpretation of Title IX.
In cases where sex discrimination claims have been raised under
Title IX, courts have given “substantial deference” to the OCR Policy
Interpretation of 1979.107 The district court in Communities for Equity
103. Id., slip op. at 2–3; Bos, supra note 87.
104. Id., slip op. at 2–3.
105. Press Release, MHSAA, Acceptance of Compliance Plan Reaffirmed in Sports Seasons
Case (Feb. 28, 2003), at http:www.mhsaa.com/news/03reaffirm.html (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
106. Press Release, MHSAA, Sports Seasons Litigation Update (Aug. 7, 2002), at
http://www.mhsaa.com/news/03litigationupdate.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
104.
107.  See, e.g., Williams v. Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 171 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1043 (1995) (“We accord HEW’s interpretation of the regulation ‘appreciable deference.’”);
Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 273 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The Policy
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misconstrued and undervalued the intent of the Policy Interpretation.
Many parts of the Policy Interpretation suggest that Michigan is in
compliance with the original intent of Title IX. The court stated that
“the federal agency originally charged with interpreting regulations
and investigating alleged violations of Title IX has noted that
elements of a program’s structure like seasons of play can constitute a
violation.”108 However, nowhere in the pages of the Policy
Interpretation referenced by the court are “seasons of play”
mentioned as a specific factor that constitutes a violation. This is not
one of the ten factors explicitly listed as part of the analysis in a Title
IX challenge.109 At most, the Policy Interpretation marginally
supports the court’s statement because it permits the Director of the
Office of Civil Rights “to consider other factors in the determination
of equal opportunity.”110 However, nothing in the Policy
Interpretation indicates that separate seasons should be accorded the
determinative weight that this factor was assigned by the court. In fact
a reasonable reading of the Policy Interpretation leads to the contrary
conclusion—that if a factor were meant to be determinative, the
drafters would have explicitly made mention of this, as they did for
the effective accommodation factor. As the analysis below
demonstrates, a close reading of the Policy Interpretation supports
the conclusion that MHSAA’s scheduling was not illegal under Title
IX.
1. Some Differences in Scheduling of Athletic Seasons Are
Legally Permissible. The Policy Interpretation notes in several places
that Title IX does not require identical programs for boys’ and girls’
teams in the same sport. Referring to an equal opportunity analysis,
the Policy Interpretation states that “identical benefits, opportunities,
or treatment are not required, provided the overall effect of any
differences is negligible,”111 and “if sport-specific needs are met
Interpretation is a ‘considered interpretation’ of the applicable regulations, and is entitled to
substantial deference by the courts.”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896–97 (1st Cir.
1993) (“Because this document is a considered interpretation of the regulation, we cede it
substantial deference.”).
108. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 856 (W.D.
Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed May 9, 2002) (citing OCR Policy
Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71, 416–18) (Dec. 11, 1979).
109. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,415. While “scheduling of games” is
one of the ten factors, “scheduling” does not refer to the season itself, but to times of day. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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equivalently in both men’s and women’s programs . . . differences in
particular program components will be found to be justifiable.”112
Presumably, this applies to the “program component” of scheduling.
Thus, if the sport-specific needs—such as coaches, facilities,
equipment, amount of games and practices113—are equivalent, one
difference such as scheduling can be considered negligible and
justified. There is no evidence that girls’ teams in Michigan suffer
from any “kind, quality or availability”114 problems as a result of the
current scheduling practices.
To reach its conclusion, the court considered evidence that girls’
basketball players suffer because they do not play their state
basketball tournament in March, during the “so-called” “March
Madness.”115 However, language in the Policy Interpretation indicates
that separate tournaments are legal under Title IX. In reference to
athletic events, such as tournaments, the Policy Interpretation states
that
differences would not violate Title IX if the recipient does not limit
the potential for women’s athletic events to rise in spectator appeal
and if the levels of event management support available to both
programs are based on sex-neutral criteria (e.g., facilities used,
projected attendance, and staffing needs).116
The court’s findings of fact also state, “‘March Madness’ is the season
of the year when basketball is the featured sporting event in the news
media because of NCAA tournaments, and a number of promotional
events promote basketball and basketball players.”117
“March Madness” is officially associated with both the NCAA
and the Illinois High School Association, not the MHSAA.118 While
112. Id. at 71,416 (explaining the “Policy” aspect of “Equivalence in Other Athletics
Benefits and Opportunities”).
113. These are among the factors listed in section 86.41(c) of the Department of Education’s
Title IX regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (2002).
114. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,415 (giving an illustration of what will
determine compliance regarding program components).
115. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 819 (W.D.
Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed May 9, 2002).
116. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,416.
117. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
118. March Madness Athletic Ass’n v. Netfire, Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:00-CV-398-R, 2003 WL
22047375, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2003). The Illinois High School Association (IHSA) has
used the term “March Madness” since the 1940s to refer to the IHSA Tournament. Id. at *7. In
1997, the ISHA began to refer to basketball related activities occurring at the same time as the
IHSA tournament as “March Madness Experience.” Id. In addition, in the early 1990’s, the
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other states specifically have chosen to associate state tournaments
with “March Madness,” Michigan has not.119 Thus, this finding does
not specifically show that MHSAA basketball is the “featured
sporting event in the news media.” In addition, there is no evidence
that the MHSAA places more importance on the boys’ basketball
tournament simply because it is held in the winter, or at the same
time as the men’s NCAA basketball tournament. In fact, the boys’
tournament began in 1925,120 before media promotion of “March
Madness” even existed.121 The court should have considered evidence
related to the factors in the Policy Interpretation rather placing such
importance on an aspect of college basketball which is not associated
with the MHSAA basketball tournament.
2. The Current MHSAA Scheduling Comports with the OCR
Factors Used to Assess Compliance. The Policy Interpretation
mentions several general athletic program components that courts
should consider when applying the Policy Interpretation in a Title IX
evaluation.122 Many of these components are more easily satisfied
when girls’ and boys’ seasons are played at separate times of the year,
making teams that play in separate seasons more likely to be in
compliance with Title IX. For the component of “scheduling of games
and practice times,”123 compliance will be assessed by evaluating
factors such as “(1) The number of competitive events per sport; (2)
The number and length of practice opportunities; (3) The time of day
competitive events are scheduled; (4) The time of day practice
IHSA began to license “March Madness” and claimed exclusive rights to the term. Id. at *8. In
addition to the IHSA’s rights in “March Madness,” the NCAA has also claimed rights to
“March Madness.” Id. at *8–*11.
119. The IHSA licensed the term “March Madness” to other state high school associations.
Id. at *8. The state licenses provided that a state high school athletic association could use the
term March Madness if the name of the state preceded the term (ex. Iowa March Madness). Id.
While approximately half of the states acquired a license to use the term, Michigan did not. The
MHSAA’s letter in response to the offer stated that “the MHSAA did not use and had no
intention of making future use of the term march madness.” Id.
120. See MHSAA, Boys Basketball Champions, 1925–2003, at http://www.mhsaa.com/
games/records/bbb.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (listing
yearly results of the boys’ basketball state championship games, beginning in 1925).
121. The NCAA’s use of the term “March Madness” is “generally traced to the 1982 NCAA
Tournament when a CBS broadcaster, Brent Musberger, described the NCAA Tournament as
‘March Madness.’” March Madness Athletic Ass’n, 2003 WL 22047375, at *8.
122. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,416.
123. See id. (presenting provisions codified in Nondiscrimination as the Basis of Sex in
Education Programs and Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance,
45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (1979)).
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opportunities are scheduled; and (5) The opportunities to engage in
available pre-season and post-season competition.”124
With separate seasons, there is an equal opportunity for girls’
and boys’ teams to enjoy many of these factors. The teams will not
have to share gym time with up to six teams at a time (boys’ and girls’
freshman, junior varsity, and varsity teams). Half as many teams
requiring access to the facilities ensures that there are twice as many
opportunities for practices, and that practices can be held during the
desired time of day. Practice time is maximized by the current
basketball system in other ways. For instance, on a day when girls’
basketball games are scheduled, practice times for the boys’ teams
must be reduced or eliminated, and vice versa.
Scheduling of games also will be optimized. When boys’ and
girls’ basketball teams play in separate seasons, both teams are able
to schedule games in the more desired evening slot. If the teams
shared a season, this slot would have to be shared as well. The Policy
Interpretation considers the limits that a schedule places on potential
spectator appeal.125 With both girls’ and boys’ basketball games
played in the prime game slot, both teams are equally likely to attract
fans to games, and maximize the level of fan attendance. The court
declined to acknowledge that the MHSAA’s schedule increased the
opportunities for fan support and attendance at games for both
genders, despite the fact that this result comports with the intent
specified in the Policy Interpretation.126
Another important component in the Policy Interpretation is the
“opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring.127 This
component addresses the relative availability of full-time coaches;
relative availability of part-time and assistant coaches; and training,
experience, and other professional qualifications of coaches.128 As one
of its justifications, the MHSAA argued that there was an insufficient
124. Id.
125. See id. (specifying that making disparate event management resources available to
men’s and women’s athletic programs “would not violate Title IX if . . . [doing so did] not limit
the potential for women’s athletic events to rise in spectator appeal”).
126. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 818 (W.D.
Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed May 9, 2002) (“[T]he only potential
advantage is the possibility that the opportunity for recruitment to play collegiate basketball
may be increased . . . .”) (emphasis added).
127. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,416; see also 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c)(5)
(2002) (codifying provisions from this section of the Federal Register).
128. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71, 416.
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number of qualified coaches in Michigan.129 The court dismissed this
justification, stating that “the empirical evidence on this point was too
sparse to make a finding that this is true.”130 If the MHSAA provides
additional evidence showing that the schedule rearrangement will
force Michigan schools to hire less qualified coaches, or that coaches
who previously coached both teams will choose to coach boys’ teams,
the Sixth Circuit should give this great deference in light of the OCR
Policy Interpretation.131 For instance, if the boys’ teams will end up
with the most qualified coaches, the switch will actually render
MHSAA less compliant with Title IX than with the current
scheduling.
Separate athletic seasons also increase the likelihood of
compliance with components (f) Provision of Locker Rooms,
Practice, and Competitive Facilities,132 and (i) Publicity.133 Under the
current system, at all times, both girls’ and boys’ teams practice in the
same quality of facilities, and both enjoy “[e]xclusiv[e] . . . use of
facilities provided for practice and competitive events.”134
Additionally, with respect to publicity, there is no danger of a
disparity in coverage in school papers, local papers, or attention given
to one team over the other by the school. In addition, the MHSAA
only contracts to televise an equal number of girls’ and boys’ sporting
events.135 Thus, teams in separate seasons do not have to compete for
attention.
129. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (rejecting the MHSAA’s arguments, including
that an insufficient number of swimming coaches and soccer officials precluded concurrent
scheduling of boys’ and girls’ seasons in those sports).
130. Id.
131. Such a proffer of evidence would be most appropriate should the Sixth Circuit decide
to remand the case.
132. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,417; see also 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c)(7)
(codifying assessment factors).
133. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,417; see also 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c)(10)
(codifying assessment factors).
134. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,417.
135.  See MHSAA, News: Local Litigation Now a National Issue, at http://www.mhsaa.
com/news/equity.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The
MHSAA requires the same network televise both its boys’ and girls’ basketball tournaments
and air an equal number of games for each gender.”).
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B. The District Court Gave Undue and Unfounded Emphasis to the
Importance of College Scholarships and Recruiting
1. The References to Recruiting in the Policy Interpretation Were
Not Intended to Apply to Interscholastic Athletics. In describing the
scope of the application of its Policy Interpretation, the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) states, “[t]his Policy
Interpretation is designed specifically for intercollegiate athletics.
However, its general principles will often apply to club, intramural,
and interscholastic athletic programs . . . .”136 Use of the word “often”
makes it clear that all of the principles do not necessarily apply to all
programs.
Both of the principles most closely related to recruiting fall into
this category. One such principle is “Recruitment of Student
Athletes,”137 a factor that the court, in reaching its conclusion that the
current sports season was discriminatory towards Michigan high
school athletes, weighed very heavily.138 The very first sentence
regarding “Application of the Policy” for “Recruitment of Student
Athletes” states, “[t]he athletic recruitment practices of institutions
often affect the overall provision of opportunity to male and female
athletes.”139 Thus, recruiting is a factor for institutions that are
recruiting athletes, rather than institutions, such as high schools, from
which athletes are recruited. The first two factors to be considered for
compliance, (1) whether coaches of male and female programs are
given substantially equal opportunities to recruit, and (2) whether
financial aid is made equally available to both sexes,140 also obviously
apply to programs that recruit athletes. In this context, it is likely that
the third factor—whether the differences in benefits, opportunities,
and treatment afforded prospective student athletes of each sex have
a disproportionate effect upon the recruitment of students of either
sex141—also was intended to apply only to the treatment of
136. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,413.
137. Id. at 71,417.
138. See, e.g., Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 823–
26 (W.D. Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed May 9, 2002) (devoting
considerable attention to the irregular season’s effect on recruitment of student athletes, in the
context of girls’ volleyball).
139. OCR Policy Interpretation, supra note 36, at 71,417.
140. Id. Even if some Michigan high schools do recruit athletes, no claim was made that
MHSAA schools violate the Equal Protection Clause or Title IX by discriminating against girls
in recruiting. Thus, recruiting is not relevant to the case here.
141. Id.
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prospective students by the organizations responsible for recruiting,
and not to interscholastic athletics programs.
The same is true of the other main provision related to recruiting
in the Policy Interpretation, which states that “institutions must
provide both the opportunity for individuals of each sex to participate
in intercollegiate competition, and for athletes of each sex to have
competitive team schedules [that] equally reflect their abilities.”142
Again, this statement, made in reference to “Levels of
Competition”143 applies specifically to intercollegiate competition. All
of the factors guiding assessment of compliance specifically use the
term “intercollegiate.”144 Only colleges truly can provide the
opportunity to participate in a college program.
2. The District Court Incorrectly Gave Substantial Consideration
to Recruiting Effects That Result from the Current MHSAA Schedule.
When deciding whether the MHSAA was a state actor, the court
found that “[t]he purpose of the MHSAA [is] to create, establish and
provide for, supervise and conduct interscholastic athletic programs
throughout the state.”145 The court further held that its analysis of
whether a violation occurred would be guided by the regulations
promulgated under Title IX.146 Thus, the court declared that its intent
was to answer the question of “whether female high school athletes
are denied the benefits of school athletic programs as a result of the
scheduling system.”147 However, the court elsewhere suggested that
“outside, business interests, like amateur athletic clubs and colleges
and universities” would be factored into its analysis.148 In its statement
of the case, the court implied that the school athletic programs, which
the MHSAA sponsors, should be the central focus of the inquiry.149
The holding of the case undermines the mission of the MHSAA, and
142. Id. at 71,418.
143. Id.
144. See id. (employing the word “intercollegiate” when describing each of the three
possible measures of compliance).
145. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 847 (W.D.
Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed May 9, 2002).
146. See id. at 857 (citing Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 879 (5th Cir.
2000)).
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. See id. at 855 n.56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (downplaying the MHSAA’s
interpretation that “Title IX does not assess the impact” of such interests).
149. See id. at 851 (“[T]he Court must decide the extent to which Defendant MHSAA exerts
control over interscholastic athletic programs of Michigan high schools.”) (emphasis added).
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instead finds that the MHSAA schedule’s impact on “outside
businesses,” which are relevant to a small percentage of high school
athletes, takes precedence over the interests of most Michigan
student-athletes, coaches, administrators, and families.
Courts should not ignore the purpose and the goals of the
MHSAA when considering what benefits a school athletic program
should be expected to confer. The MHSAA Articles of Incorporation
provide that the goals of the Association include “the interest in
physical welfare and fitness of the students participating therein by
giving the opportunity to participate in athletics designed to meet the
needs and abilities of all.”150 Therefore, the primary objective of high
school athletics in Michigan is not developing and preparing athletes
for collegiate-level competition. Thus, by looking beyond the “school
athletic programs,” and giving great weight to “outside, business
interests,” the court exceeded the scope of the inquiry it had set for its
analysis.
The MHSAA’s argument regarding Title IX does not twist the
issue, but rather, it is a legitimate argument addressed to Title IX’s
intent. The court’s analysis should have centered on whether the
recipient of the federal funds, the MHSAA, discriminates within its
own organization. Here, the plaintiffs claimed that female high school
students are denied the benefits of school athletic programs.151 The
court’s eventual holding suggests that one of the most important
functions of school athletic programs is developing collegiate-level
athletes.152 This is contrary to the very purpose of the MHSAA, which
endeavors to provide opportunities to students of all abilities. The
MHSAA recognizes that high school athletic programs serve a
greater purpose than catering to only the most elite level of athletes.
While the claim against the MHSAA addresses Michigan high school
athletic programs, a great deal of the court’s analysis centers around
other, disconnected programs, including participation in special
events for professional or semiprofessional teams,153 participation in
150. Id. at 810 (quoting MHSAA Articles of Incorporation) (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 855.
152. See id. at 857 (alluding to “Findings of Fact” section, which outlined lost recruiting
opportunities for female volleyball players who compete in the winter). This reference suggests
that the court considered lost recruiting opportunities to be one of the “disadvantages” that
female, but not male, athletes in Michigan suffer.
153. See id. at 818 (acknowledging “credible evidence” that female athletes were
disadvantaged by not being able to participate in special events for professional or
semiprofessional teams, like playing at halftime of a professional game that takes place in the
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United States Volleyball Association (USAV) matches,154 summer
and club swimming,155 and soccer programs such as the United States
Soccer Federation (USSF), the American Youth Soccer Organization
(AYSO), and the Olympic Development Program (ODP).156
3. After Accepting the Significance of Evidence Related to
Recruiting, the Court’s Subsequent Analysis of Recruiting Effects Still
Was Flawed Due to Inconsistencies in Reasoning. Even if the court
properly considered recruiting opportunities, the court’s analysis of
this issue was inconsistent. The court stated that the “only potential
advantage” to playing basketball in the fall is the increased possibility
of recruitment opportunities.157 Nevertheless, it declined to concede
even this factor in favor of the MHSAA, because “the MHSAA did
not offer any evidence to prove that [increased opportunities for
recruitment] translated into more scholarships or spots on collegiate
basketball teams [for Michigan girls].”158 The court dismissed the
MHSAA’s argument that scheduling girls’ basketball in the fall is
actually beneficial to recruited athletes. Testimony from Michigan
high school coaches and the head coach at the University of Michigan
supported this argument.159 Additionally, the MHSAA showed that
traditional season). It seems ironic that a court so concerned with whether female sports are
played during traditional seasons neglects to mention that the Women’s National Basketball
Association (WNBA) season is in the summer (a nontraditional season for basketball), and that
the MHSAA scheduling has no impact on whether girls can participate in halftime events for
the league. The WNBA is an all female professional basketball league that plays during the
National Basketball Association (NBA)’s offseason, from May to September. See WNBA,
WNBA Schedule 2003, at http://www.wnba.com/schedules/index.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2003)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing schedule of games for 2003 season).
154. See Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 823 (discussing the importance of private club
programs for volleyball recruiting).
155. See id. at 835 ( discussing effect of summer swimming on participation in high school
swimming programs, and recognizing MHSAA’s concern that”[j]oining the [girls’ and boys’ high
school] seasons would . . . cause a decline in club programs that rent pool space from schools”).
156. See id. at 830 (stating that girls but not boys lose opportunities to participate in USSF,
AYSO and ODP programs). In reality, the club seasons for female soccer players in Michigan
are scheduled in the fall and winter, and thus do not conflict with high school soccer, and the
girls’ ODP program is conducted in the summer and fall as well. Girls in Michigan are able to
participate in both high school soccer and ODP and club programs.
157. Id. at 817.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 820–21. In particular, Sue Guevara, head coach, testified that many women’s
college basketball coaches from around the country are able to attend the top girls’ games in
Michigan. Prior to October, high school games attended do not count against the contact limit
of forty games instituted by the NCAA. It is also more convenient for college coaches to attend
fall games because they do not have a conflict with the NCAA season, which is in the winter. Id.
SCHAFER.DOC 01/30/04 9:05 AM
2003] FOLLOWING THE LAW, NOT THE CROWD 249
only six of the “Mr. Basketball” title recipients have played collegiate
basketball at out-of-state schools, whereas fifteen “Miss Basketball”
recipients have done so.160 This suggests that female basketball players
enjoy additional recruiting success. The court reasoned that even if
Michigan girls currently have special advantages in being recruited, if
the girls played during the winter season, “they would, at the very
least, be on ‘equal footing’ with Michigan boys and with girls in the
rest of the country with respect to collegiate recruiting.”161 This
finding is inconsistent with the court’s earlier statement that it cares
about traditional athletic seasons only to the extent that a traditional
season is the most advantageous.162 Thus, the court’s opinion admits
that the current girls’ basketball season provides advantages for
recruiting, but the court’s holding ultimately removes this advantage.
This is puzzling, given that recruiting disadvantages were one of the
plaintiffs’ main concerns.163
Additionally, the court’s findings regarding recruiting for female
basketball and volleyball players are also problematic. The court’s
decision implies that the wishes of volleyball players should take
precedence over those of basketball players. The court found that
“[t]he MHSAA high school [volleyball] season . . . disadvantages
Michigan girls seeking college athletic scholarships because it occurs
after the NCAA’s early signing date.”164 However, if the MHSAA
switched girls’ volleyball and basketball seasons, the girls’ basketball
players would be affected by the timing of the signing date. Girls’
basketball players would have to sign letters of intent to compete in
college before their senior year season, as volleyball players do now.
It is inevitable that some athletic seasons must occur after the signing
date. Giving volleyball players this particular advantage does not
eliminate alleged discrimination against female athletes resulting
from the scheduling of athletic seasons. The change simply will affect
different female athletes. The result will not be that fewer athletes, or
female athletes in general, are less affected by the timing of the
signing date.
160. Id. at 821 n.14. “Mr. Basketball” and “Miss Basketball” titles are awarded to
Michigan’s top players each year. Id.
161. Id. at 820.
162. See id. at 808 (“In this case, the Court cares about traditional sports seasons only to the
extent that a traditional season . . . happens to be the most advantageous playing season . . . .”).
163. See, e.g., id. at 824–26 (describing recruiting disadvantages suffered by plaintiff
volleyball players).
164. Id. at 825.
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C. Evidence of Higher Student-Athlete Participation in Michigan
Shows the “Exceedingly Persuasive” Justification Necessary to
Defeat an Equal Protection Challenge.
The court rejected the MHSAA’s argument that evidence of high
participation rates for high school sports in Michigan is due to the
current scheduling system.165 The court concluded that the
participation rates were only “circumstantial evidence.”166 These
numbers, however, are not circumstantial evidence. They are actual
counts of participants in high school sports and they offer the best
opportunity to illustrate that Michigan girls, as compared to girls in
other states, are equally, if not more, advantaged by Michigan’s
current athletics schedule. These numbers illustrate, and the MHSAA
believes, that the state is maximizing opportunities for participation
by female athletes.167 The MHSAA based its argument on statistics,
rather than the “overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females” that are
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.168
While Judge Enslen insisted that the MHSAA switch its girls’
basketball and volleyball seasons,169 the evidence shows that
Michigan’s schedule maximizes participation in these sports. In more
than half of the states in which both girls’ and boys’ basketball are
scheduled for the same season, freshman or junior varsity squads
have been eliminated.170 This was done in order “to accommodate
[increased] demands on facilities, coaches and officials,”171 which was
also one of the justifications for the current scheduling of basketball
and volleyball offered by the MHSAA and rejected by the court.172
With the current scheduling, Michigan averages thirty girls’
basketball players per school,173 far more than in other states. For
example, Missouri and Iowa average twenty-four players, Ohio
165. Id. at 841–42.
166. Id. at 841.
167. See Compliance Plan, supra note 89 (stressing that switching seasons would involve
tradeoffs, benefiting some schools but disadvantaging others).
168. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 532–33 (1996)).
169. See supra Part II.D.1.
170. Becker, supra note 89.
171. Id.
172. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 839–42.
173. Bob Becker, Decision Misguided on Many Levels, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 2,
2002, at B1, available at 2002 WL 23818869.
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averages twenty-three players, Florida averages twenty-one players,
Alabama and Oklahoma average fifteen players, and Tennessee
averages fourteen players per school.174 Judge Enslen used Kentucky
to illustrate that a state can schedule boys’ and girls’ basketball during
the same season.175 However, Kentucky has only 5,950 girls playing
basketball, well surpassed by the 21,000 girls playing basketball in
Michigan.176 Taking into account Michigan’s larger size, Kentucky still
averages only twenty-one players per school, which equates to two
basketball teams per school, as compared to Michigan’s thirty-player
average and three teams per school. Further, the Kentucky girls’ state
basketball tournament is held earlier than the boys’ state
tournament.177 This gives boys a longer season, and suggests that the
girls are a “warm up act,” while the boys enjoy the “grand finale”—
two factors that the court critiqued in the Michigan system.178
With the advent of Title IX and the requirement that schools
support girls’ teams, many schools eliminated freshman or junior
varsity basketball teams, or downsized volleyball programs and
seasons.179 Currently in Michigan, nearly the same number of girls
play basketball in the fall (21,000), as girls who play volleyball in the
winter (21,500).180 This is not the case in other states. For example,
Georgia schedules boys’ and girls’ basketball seasons at the same
time. However, only 181 of the state’s high schools that offer girls’
basketball also offer girls’ volleyball, and the volleyball season is
limited to only fifteen days of competition.181 In other states, many
schools that sponsor girls’ basketball do not sponsor volleyball.182
Although these numbers do not prove that the scheduling system
174. Becker, supra note 89.
175. Cmtys. For Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:98-CV-479, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14220, at *19 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2002).
176. Becker, supra note 173.
177. Id.
178. See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 820
(W.D. Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed May 9, 2002) (observing that, in
Michigan, “[t]he boys’ high school basketball season is approximately three weeks longer than
the girls’ season”); id. at 836–37 (expressing concern about the psychological effects of treating
girls like “second class” citizens).
179. Becker, supra note 89.
180. Fred Girard, Proposal Switches Girls’ Prep Seasons, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 31, 2002, at
E1, available at 2002 WL 102335394.
181. Becker, supra note 89.
182. See Becker, supra note 173 (reporting that these schools number 380 in Oklahoma, 283
in Texas, and 240 in New Jersey).
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causes greater participation in Michigan, they do show that the
schedule does not harm the participation rates. Thus, they provide the
exceedingly persuasive justification needed to show that the current
scheduling system meets Michigan’s “important” goal of maximizing
participation rates.
IV.  POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF COMMUNITIES FOR EQUITY AND
STRATEGY FOR FUTURE STATE DEFENDANTS
The court’s ruling in Communities for Equity is significant
because it provides a starting point for the defense of a nontraditional
athletics season. The stakes are high for athletes and administrators
across the country. While the court’s holding will most directly affect
Michigan, its impact also will be felt nationwide. For instance, a
favorable finding for Michigan may provide states like South Dakota
that are reluctantly switching athletic seasons with a stronger, and
thus less costly, defense.183 In addition, this holding will affect all
states that plan to add new sports or additional high school state
tournaments. If state high school athletic associations plan to expand
a schedule to include sports in “nontraditional seasons,” these
associations will need to understand what justifications are legally
sufficient. A holding against scheduling athletic seasons for
nontraditional athletic seasons may have a chilling effect on the
sanction of new high school sports. A state that is considering offering
a new sport in a nontraditional season due to preexisting use of
facilities, coaches, or officials during that sport’s “traditional season”
may shy away from adding the sport because of the threat of potential
litigation.
Next to Michigan, Hawaii stands to lose the most from a ruling
against nontraditional seasons. Hawaii presently schedules boys’ and
girls’ basketball seasons at different times of the year, and Hawaii is
also the only state in which high school girls play basketball in the
spring.184 Though in 1999, Hawaii Governor Ben Cayetano directed
the superintendent of education and high school athletic directors to
183. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
184. Dave Reardon, Spring Hoops Might Not Be Federal Case, HONOLULU STAR-BULL.,
Dec. 13, 2000, http://starbulletin.com/2000/12/13/sports/story2.html. In Rhode Island, girls’
volleyball is also played in a nontraditional sports season. Communities for Equity, CFE v.
MHSAA, at http://www.communitiesforequity.com/mhsaa.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2003) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal). Thus, this state may anticipate a legal battle to switch
scheduling based on the outcome of the Communities for Equity case.
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swap the girls’ high school basketball and softball seasons to align
them with college schedules,185 the Hawaii High School Athletic
Association (HHSAA)’s schedule remains unchanged today.186 In
fact, in 2000, representatives from the United States Education
Department told Hawaii school officials that both nontraditional
athletic seasons and different seasons for boys and girls are not
necessarily violations of Title IX.187 Thus, in Hawaii, girls’ basketball
remains a spring sport, while girls’ softball is played in the winter
season.188 As in Michigan, rearranging these two sports in Hawaii
could adversely impact almost all of the sports currently offered by
the HHSAA.189 In Hawaii, overlapping the baseball and softball
seasons would overtax the existing facilities, as few schools have fields
for both baseball and softball.190 The softball teams, which require a
smaller field, would have to share city parks that are used for youth
softball and baseball seasons during the spring.191 In addition, the
HHSAA calendar is currently balanced, with five sports played in
each of the three seasons. If Hawaii realigns its athletic seasons, six
sports would be played in the fall, seven in the spring, and only two in
the winter.192 The outcome of the Communities for Equity case will
influence whether the HHSAA retains its current schedules.
States like Hawaii, therefore, should pay close attention to the
lessons that can be gleaned from the Communities for Equity case.
The case highlights several specific areas that would strengthen the
defense of a nontraditional athletic season. Any defense against a
claim of a Title IX equal opportunity violation must show that the
scheduling comports with the ten factors in subsection (c) of section
185. Cindy Luis, Cayetano Wants Season Switch, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Oct. 5, 1999,
http://starbulletin.com/1999/10/05/sports/story1.html.
186. See 2003-2004 HHSAA Championships, at http://www.hhsaa.org/page_server/PrepNews/
Articles/7A3299077493F258F731C29448.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2003) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (listing the championship dates for all Hawaii high school sports, including girls’
softball and basketball).
187. See Reardon, supra note 184 (quoting the United States Department of Education’s
Office of Civil Rights representatives as saying that “[t]here’s nothing that says boys’ and girls’
basketball teams have to play at the same time as the college teams do,” and that “[t]here is
nothing in Title IX that says that boys and girls must play in the same season”).
188. Id.
189. Luis, supra note 185.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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106.41 and meets the effective accommodation test.193 Other factors
also will contribute to a strong defense. The first of these is testimony.
While the plaintiffs in Communities for Equity called several former
female Michigan high school athletes as witnesses, the defendants
failed to call any female athletes who preferred the current sports
schedule, a fact that undermined the MHSAA’s assertion that
Michigan girls prefer the current seasons.194 Such testimony would
counter the opinions of girls who feel discriminated against, and show
that there is statewide support for the current system. Future
defendants should learn from the court’s skepticism toward testimony
presented by coaches with the most successful programs in the state
who favored the current system—i.e., coaches with a vested interest in
maintaining the status quo.195 Defendants should offer testimony of
coaches and players who have experienced varying degrees of athletic
success under the current system. This approach was successful in
Ridgeway, where the defendants presented a comprehensive,
independent report indicating that the current seasons were favored
by a large majority of the state’s players and residents.196
Athletic associations also can strengthen their defense by
preparing surveys and reports to counter anticipated arguments from
the plaintiffs. The Communities for Equity court found the
defendant’s survey results failed to support the MHSAA’s assertion
that Michigan girls prefer the current seasons because of design flaws
and bias.197 The court also found the survey lacked the independent
analysis needed “to determine the potential benefits and detriments
of moving [the] seasons.”198 The court was particularly concerned with
the paucity of member schools and girls that were actually
193. See supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text.
194. Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 843 (W.D.
Mich. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 02-1127 (6th Cir. filed May 9, 2002).
195.  See id. at 821:
While the Court places a good deal of weight on [the coach’s] impression . . . her
testimony must also be considered in light of Flint Powers’ status as “one of the most
successful” girls’ basketball teams in Michigan whose “experiences [might be]
different from the run-of-the-mill programs in the state.”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
196. See Ridgeway v. Mont. High Sch. Ass’n, 858 F.2d 579, 586 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that
the report prepared by the facilitator appointed by the parties concluded that the current
seasons were “favored by a large majority of Montanans, including the players,” and
recommended that the same seasonal structure be retained at that time).
197. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 842–43.
198. Id. at 843.
SCHAFER.DOC 01/30/04 9:05 AM
2003] FOLLOWING THE LAW, NOT THE CROWD 255
surveyed.199 A state that is threatened by litigation should be prepared
to present a detailed survey that encompasses as many schools as
possible. Additionally, athletic associations should also prepare
reports outlining the negative effects of switching athletic seasons.
For instance, in Striebel v. Minnesota State High School League,200 the
defendants convinced the court that there was no feasible way to
accommodate boys’ and girls’ teams in the same season because of
limited access to athletic facilities.201 The HHSAA likely can use this
approach successfully because it can demonstrate that Hawaii’s
limited amount of land and high real estate costs cause similar
difficulties.
Yet another way to strengthen a defense is to present evidence
that participation rates will decrease if the scheduling is changed. The
MHSAA attempted to present such evidence by calling the
organization’s communications director to testify to participation
numbers, percentages, and comparisons to other states.202
Nevertheless, this testimony was disallowed as “anecdotal” and
irrelevant.203 Thus, a state should be prepared to offer such evidence,
justify this evidence, and form a counterargument as to why it is
relevant and reliable.
Finally, even the court in Communities for Equity acknowledged
that it is legally possible for a sport to be scheduled in a
nontraditional season, so long as it is the most advantageous season,
and girls and boys are equally advantaged.204 Therefore, arguments in
defense of nontraditional athletic seasons also should make a
connection between the evidence presented and the resulting
199. Id. at 843 (remarking that only one-third of the girls were surveyed at sixty of the 729
member schools, of which only two-thirds had played sports in a disadvantaged season).
200. 321 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982).
201. Id. at 402. The Supreme Court of Minnesota found the evidence “uncontroverted” that
there was limited access to pools and tennis courts in many high schools, and thus “no feasible
way to accommodate boys’ and girls’ teams in the same season existed.” Id. Though the court
acknowledged there were alternative methods for dividing athletes between two seasons,
neither the current system nor the alternatives were “without disadvantages.” Id.
202. Becker, supra note 173. This article suggests that Judge Enslen was heavily biased
toward the plaintiffs. See id. (“[H]e built his response around figures presented by CFE, even
though he denied the MHSAA the opportunity to present its own set of numbers and
explanations for them.”). Therefore, it is likely that another court would be much more willing
to allow evidence of this nature.
203. See id. (criticizing Judge Enslen’s decision in Cmtys. for Equity); Cmtys. for Equity, 178
F. Supp. 2d at 828 (labeling the evidence presented concerning any possible logistical problems
stemming from traditional season play “anecdotal”).
204. Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
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advantage for that sport’s participants. Additionally, the advantages
of the current or proposed schedule should be the primary theme that
resonates through all arguments in defense of scheduling.
CONCLUSION
It is legally permissible to schedule girls’ and boys’ sports in
separate seasons. What remains to be seen is exactly how difficult it
will be to justify doing so. This Note argues that the most recent case
to address the issue, Communities for Equity, failed to correctly
analyze gender discrimination in high school sports programs, and
thus articulated an incorrect and excessively restrictive standard. In
the near future, courts will face the difficult task of distinguishing
personal preferences from true gender discrimination in Communities
for Equity and other cases. Such a determination should be guided by
existing case law and established guidelines, such as the OCR Policy
Interpretation. Additionally, courts must consider all of the
information presented before deciding whether accommodating some
girls justifies harming thousands of other student-athletes, coaches,
and school and state administrators. In the end, so long as the
differences between boys’ and girls’ programs are negligible and
justified, separate interscholastic athletic seasons do not violate Title
IX or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
